Profile
Sergio E. Mancinas
IT Security Engineer
I deal with security incidents when they happen, then work on the systems and processes that make the next one less likely.
My work is incident response, identity and access management, vulnerability triage and a fair amount of internal platform work, plus coordinating the annual SOC 2 penetration test and the remediation that follows it.
Outside of work I'm finishing a master's in Communication Systems and Networks, researching sender-constrained OAuth and intrusion detection for VoIP.
- Based
- Cologne, Germany
- Languages
- Spanish (native), English (fluent), German (B1)
Beyond work
I run, train calisthenics, and am slowly working toward an ultramarathon. I read a lot of philosophy, mostly the Stoics. My music taste is broad, but Tool is the constant.
Domains
Select a domain for detail
Okta and SCIM provisioning: joiner-mover-leaver, access requests, group-based permissions, plus the just-in-time platforms that replace standing access with request-based approval.
- Okta
- SCIM
- Entitle
- 1Password
- Group rules
Hands-on incident investigation: log analysis, root-cause tracing, containment, credential rotation, and closing the gap that let it happen. Every incident gets a postmortem, with a plain-language version for customer-facing ones.
- Wazuh
- Suricata
- PagerDuty
- Postmortems
- Anomaly detection
I handle triage and remediation across a large repository estate: setting SLAs, chasing end-of-life dependencies, reviewing vendor risk. Findings go to the team that owns the code, not to a queue.
- Aikido
- Vanta
- CVSS
- SLA tracking
Scanner gating in CI blocks a merge request that introduces a new finding. Repository ownership is mapped so results land with the team that owns the code, not a shared inbox, extending to blocking malicious package installs on the endpoint.
- SCA
- CI gating
- Secret scanning
- Container & IaC
- Jamf
Browser authentication hardening, done in stages: moving tokens out of places they shouldn't sit, shortening their lifetime, adding refresh-token rotation, and tightening CSP. API authorisation moved onto proper scopes, plus security headers and version disclosure at the edge.
- OAuth 2.0
- CSP
- Token rotation
- API scopes
- Security headers
AWS and GCP, provisioned through Terraform. I review firewall and security-group rules across production and staging, write WAF policy, and handle edge hardening through Fastly VCL and Cloud Armor, including closing off direct-to-origin bypasses that a WAF alone won't catch.
- AWS
- GCP
- Terraform
- Cloud Armor
- Fastly
- WAF
I pull together SOC 2 evidence and write policy aligned to ISO 27001 and NIST. A fair amount is vendor-facing: questionnaires, DPA reviews, and following remediation until it's actually closed, not just logged. I also built the internal platform that ties controls and findings back to the teams that own them.
- SOC 2
- ISO 27001 / NIST
- Vanta
- Control mapping
Security engineering meets AI tooling: reviewing and approving AI tools against a registry of what's allowed, and investigating credentials leaking into LLM context through agent skills. I've also hardened a retrieval-augmented Slack assistant against prompt injection, with a content-safety gate on ingest and runtime rules that reject claimed authority. The rest is the OAuth 2.1 layer behind our MCP integrations.
- MCP
- OAuth 2.1
- RAG
- Prompt injection defense
- Tool governance
- LLM context review
Not a full-time penetration tester, but I built a containerised hub that puts 25-plus offensive tools behind one interface: recon, fuzzing, exploitation, cloud and code scanning. Hands-on, that's mostly content discovery and verifying a reported finding actually reproduces. I also coordinate the annual third-party penetration test, re-checking vendor severity against real exploitability before routing findings.
- nmap
- nuclei
- ffuf
- sqlmap
- MobSF
- ScoutSuite
- Amass
Deletion pipelines and deletion-latency tracking against GDPR timelines, plus data classification. A recurring issue is personal data turning up somewhere it shouldn't, most often application or gateway logs, and helping the owning team remove it.
- GDPR
- Data classification
- Deletion pipelines
- PII in logs
Capabilities
Security engineering
- Incident response
- Root-cause analysis
- Threat modelling
- Detection engineering
- Vulnerability management
- Pentest remediation
- Vendor risk assessment
- Endpoint hardening
- Secret rotation
Identity & application security
- OAuth 2.0 / 2.1
- OIDC
- SCIM
- PKCE
- Okta
- CSP
- API authorisation
Security frameworks
- STRIDE
- OWASP ASVS
- MITRE ATT&CK / ATLAS
- NIST AI RMF
- LINDDUN
Controls & compliance
- SOC 2
- ISO 27001 / NIST
- GDPR
- Vanta
- Control mapping
Cloud & infrastructure
- AWS
- GCP
- Terraform
- Kubernetes
- Docker
- Cloud Run
- Ansible
- Linux
Security & detection tooling
- Wazuh
- Suricata
- Aikido
- Jamf
- 1Password
- PagerDuty
Edge & network
- Fastly
- Cloud Armor
- WAF
Engineering & data
- Python
- Kotlin
- TypeScript
- Bash
- SQL
- FastAPI
- PostgreSQL
- Redis
- Kafka
- ClickHouse
Delivery & automation
- GitLab CI
- GitHub Actions
- Jira
- Confluence
- n8n
- Google Workspace
Experience
NewStore
BerlinIT Security Engineer
Protecting a unified commerce platform used by global retail brands, across offices in Europe and North America.
- Incident response means actually investigating, not just coordinating a ticket: logs, root cause, containment, credential rotation, and a blameless five-whys postmortem, tracked through DFIR-IRIS, the case-management platform I introduced for the team.
- I coordinate the annual SOC 2 penetration test and the remediation that follows, plus vendor security reviews across mobile, web and infrastructure.
- I own identity and access management: Okta and SCIM provisioning, recurring access reviews, plus the secret and credential rotation that goes with it.
- On the supply-chain side, I built out dependency, secret, container and IaC scanning across the estate and mapped repository ownership so a finding lands with the team that can actually fix it, not a shared queue.
- The bigger build has been extending OWASP ThreatAtlas, an open-source threat-modelling platform, with an MCP layer and STRIDE-based models on top: it maps engineering ownership, repositories and risk into one place, reachable through about seventy MCP tools with per-user Okta authentication. I built the OAuth 2.1 layer behind it myself, including a small relay to work around an identity provider's dynamic client registration that assumes an admin token no MCP client actually has.
- The rest is the security review queue for new tools, and day-to-day operations on a Jamf-managed fleet, including CIS Level 1 hardening: baseline first, then remediate in stages.
Zattoo
Zurich / BerlinMultiplatform Engineer, Playback
Playback quality and telemetry for a European streaming platform, at a scale of millions of viewing sessions.
- Collaborated on the Kafka pipelines carrying playback telemetry from those sessions into something queryable.
- Modelled the analytics in ClickHouse, so a quality regression showed up broken down by device and region rather than as a single aggregate number.
- Wrote the monitoring services in Kotlin.
Zattoo
Zurich / BerlinIT & Infrastructure Intern
Mandatory internship for my B.Sc., in the Onsite IT & Infrastructure team, where I also wrote my thesis on ML-based anomaly detection.
- Designed and ran a Wazuh SIEM with Isolation Forest anomaly detection across 400+ endpoints on two continents, with alert rules I wrote myself rather than the defaults.
- Automated the roughly twenty-step onboarding and offboarding process in Python and n8n, which meant nobody had to touch it by hand again.
- Wrote the patch policy against ISO 27001 and NIST, and did the actual endpoint hardening through Mosyle and NinjaOne.
- Set up network monitoring with SNMP, using Telegraf, InfluxDB and Grafana, and handled VPN access across the org.
Billie
BerlinWorking Student, Digital Workplace
Access control and IT infrastructure at a B2B payments company under BaFin supervision.
- Evaluated four just-in-time access platforms, picked Entitle, and wired it into Okta so approvals became self-service instead of a ticket to IT.
- That cut standing privileges by 60%, and made the access reviews BaFin requires something a small team could actually get through.
- Endpoint hardening, security policy, asset management.
MCC Consultores
Mexico CityIT Operations and Automation
Part-time IT and automation work at a firm managing large infrastructure projects, done alongside my undergraduate studies.
- Built automation that replaced manual reporting across energy, water treatment and industrial projects.
- Documentation, technical support, the usual part-time-job mix of everything else.
MICSA
Mexico City / Panama CityFinance Analyst
My first role, in finance rather than technology, before I relocated to Germany and moved into engineering.
- Contract monitoring and cost control across projects in two countries.
- Where I learned to read a control until it either holds or it doesn't.
Education
M.Sc. Communication Systems and Networks
TH KölnCologne
Network security, applied cryptography and cloud computing.
B.Sc. Software Engineering
University of Europe for Applied SciencesPotsdam
Academic scholarship. Thesis: Cybersecurity Monitoring — A Machine Learning and Wazuh Integrated Approach.
B.A. Economics and Finance
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de MéxicoMexico City
Debate team. Moved into software engineering after relocating to Germany.
Certifications
- 2026CCNA v7 — Introduction to NetworksCisco
- 2024Jamf Endpoint Security AssociateJamf
- 2024IBM Data Analytics EssentialsCoursera
- 2024German B1.1crossXculture
In progressCCSK v5 · CCNA v7 — ENSA / SRWE · Certified in Cybersecurity (CC) · AWS Cloud Practitioner
Selected work
Operational realities of sender-constrained OAuth: replay-state scaling thresholds and silent binding failures in distributed resource-server deployments
Research paper · TH Köln
Sender-constraining defends against the token replay behind recent large-scale breaches. I measured where DPoP's replay-state requirement stops scaling across distributed resource servers (the crossover lands around 17 requests per second on a single node), and found binding failures that fail quietly.
- OAuth 2.0
- DPoP
- mTLS
- FAPI 2.0
- Keycloak
Attack, detect, defend on SIP: a reproducible self-labeling testbed comparing signature, correlation and machine-learning detection
Lab project · TH Köln
A testbed that attacks its own SIP infrastructure to label its own data, then runs three detection strategies against the same ground truth: Suricata signatures, Wazuh correlation, and an XGBoost classifier. Response runs through a Shuffle SOAR workflow, with Vector shipping logs to ClickHouse for observability.
- SIP
- Suricata
- Wazuh
- XGBoost
- HEP
- Shuffle SOAR
- Vector
- ClickHouse
WebRTC conferencing with end-to-end encryption
Lab report · TH Köln
A self-hosted conferencing system that stays end-to-end encrypted even though a server routes the media. Frames are encrypted client-side with AES-256-GCM, keyed via HKDF-SHA256, before they reach the LiveKit SFU. Coturn handles NAT traversal, backed by Postgres auth and a Prometheus, Grafana and Loki stack for observability.
- WebRTC
- E2EE
- LiveKit
- Coturn
- SFrame
- PostgreSQL
- Prometheus
Cybersecurity monitoring with machine learning and Wazuh
B.Sc. thesis
A full-stack SIEM pairing Wazuh with Isolation Forest anomaly detection for real-time alerting, deployed on AWS with Docker Compose and PostgreSQL.
- Wazuh
- Python
- AWS
- Docker
- PostgreSQL
Contact
Open to conversations about security engineering roles and research collaboration. Feel free to reach out.
- sergioemancinas
- GitHub
- sergioemancinas